In many countries, the monetary policy instrument sometimes remains unchanged for a long period and shows infrequent responses to exogenous shocks. The purpose of this paper is to provide a new explanation on why the central bank's policy instrument remains unchanged. In the analysis, we explore how uncertainty on the private agents' expectations affects robust optimal monetary policy. We apply the Choquet expected decision theory to a new Keynesian model. A main result is that the policymaker may frequently keep the interest rate unchanged even when exogenous shocks change output gaps and inflation rates. This happens because a change of the interest rate increases additional uncertainty for the policymaker. To the extent that the policymaker has uncertainty aversion, it can therefore be optimal for the policymaker to maintain an unchanged policy stance for some significant periods and to make discontinuous changes of the target rate. Our analysis departs from previous studies in that we determine an optimal monetary policy rule that allows time-variant feedback parameters in a Taylor rule. We show that if the policymaker has small uncertainty aversion, the calibrated optimal stop-go policy rule can predict actual target rates of FRB and ECB reasonably well. JEL Classification Numbers: E40, E52, D81
Introduction
In monetary economics, it has widely been discussed what policy rules central banks follow. A growing number of studies advocate a variety of monetary policy rules that can lead to good performance. In particular, many argue that macroeconomic stabilization should be implemented through a "Taylor rule" in which interest rates are adjusted in response to output gap and inflation rate. However, when we look at high-frequency data, the policy instrument sometimes remains unchanged for a long period and shows infrequent responses to frequent exogenous shocks. One of the reasons why the changes of the targeted FF rates were infrequent is that the FOMC meeting is usually held only eight times a year. It is the FOMC that decides some discontinuous jumps of the targeted rates. However, except in 2001 and 2005, the FOMC decided not to change the target rate in most of the meetings (see Table 1 ). Infrequent FOMC meetings would not be enough to explain less frequent changes of the targeted rates. More infrequent policy changes can be observed for the other central banks that face different environments. For example, Table 2 Why do the central banks decide not to change the policy targets frequently? The purpose of this paper is to provide a new explanation on why the central bank's policy instrument remains unchanged under uncertainty. In general, the policymaker faces various types of uncertainty when making the policy decision. This includes uncertainty on exogenous shocks and on structural parameters. However, uncertainty on the private agents' expectations is another uncertainty that the central bank may face.
Since the expectations affect output gaps and inflation rates, it is important to identify how the private agents form their expectations. However, as recent contribution of behavioral economics suggests, it is far from easy to predict what expectations the private agents will form.
In the following analysis, we explore how uncertainty on the private agents' expectations affects optimal monetary policy in a new Keynesian model. The decision-making theory we use in the analysis is that of expected utility under a nonadditive probability measure, that is, the Choquet expected model, developed by Gilboa (1987) and Schmeidler (1989) . 2 We apply the Choquet expected decision theory to a new Keynesian model. A main result is that the policymaker may frequently keep the interest rate unchanged even when exogenous shocks change output gaps and inflation rates. This happens because a change of the interest rate increases uncertainty for the policymaker when how the expectations will react is not well known.
To the extent that the policymaker has uncertainty aversion, it can therefore be optimal for the policymaker to maintain an unchanged policy stance for some significant periods and to make discontinuous changes of the target rate.
In previous literature, there are a large number of studies that focused on model uncertainty and the performance of policy rules across different models. Brainard (1967) is a seminal study that explored how the policymaker's optimal rule is altered when faced with parameter uncertainty. McCallum (1988) has argued for evaluating policy proposals in a variety of economic models as a means of assessing their robustness. Using five macroeconomic models, Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003) identify the robust rules that respond to the inflation forecast and the output gap but that incorporate a substantial degree of policy inertia. Using a new Keynesian model, Woodford (2003a, 2003b) have analyzed policy rules that are robust to misspecification of the disturbance process of a known model, while Kimura and Kurozumi (2003) and Levin and Williams (2003b) have focused on whether parameter uncertainty leads to more cautious or more aggressive policy responses to shocks when the effects of structural parameters on the loss function are taken into account.
However, none of these studies incorporated Knightian uncertainty.
Several other studies explored "robust optimal policy rules" under a version of Knightian uncertainty, which are designed to be robust in the sense of minimizing the worst case scenario when the policymaker believes that the true model is in a neighborhood of a given reference model. These studies include Hansen and Sargent (2003) , Onatski and Stock (2002) , Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001), Giannoni (2006) , and Orphanides and Williams, (2007) . Walsh (2004) has argued that optimal monetary policy under Hansen-Sargent framework is equivalent to that of Giannoni and Woodford where the optimal policy rule becomes less aggressive under uncertainty. In 4 contrast, Onatski and Stock argued that the max-min approach of robust control provides robust monetary policies that are more aggressive than the optimal policies absent model uncertainty. 3 However, unlike ours, none of these studies has reached a conclusion that the optimal policy is to keep the policy instrument unchanged for some periods.
Our analysis departs from these previous studies in four important respects. First, instead of restricting ourselves to time-invariant feedback parameters, we determine a robust optimal monetary policy rule that allows time-variant feedback parameters.
This leads to an optimal stop-go policy rule that sometimes responds to output and inflation gaps but sometimes does not. Second, we show that the calibrated optimal stop-go policy rules can predict actual target rates of FRB and ECB well if the policymaker has small uncertainty aversion. In literature, Hamilton and Jorà (2002) showed that statistical tool for forecasting a discrete-valued time series is useful in forecasting the federal fund rates. Our optimal stop-go policy rule not only supports their proposition but also provides theoretical background for the discrete-valued time series. Third, we consider the case where the private agents' expectations are uncertain for the policymaker when changing the policy instrument. Previous studies widely discussed what happens when exogenous shocks or/and structural parameters are uncertain. But few studies discussed when the private agents' expectations are uncertain. Our result suggests uncertainty on the private agents' expectations is another important uncertainty in a robust control framework. Fourth, we derive robust policy rules based on the Choquet expected utility model rather than on the max-min utility model. In literature, it is known that the two models are essentially the same.
But in macroeconomic policy analysis, previous studies used the max-min utility model almost exclusively. Our analysis suggests that the Choquet expected utility model is an alternative useful framework to derive robust policy rules.
Our result is similar to that of Dow and Werlang (1992) in that a player chooses the status quo under Knightian uncertainty. Dow and Werlang provide a simple example where the optimal portfolio choice can be the status quo under Knightian uncertainty.
Given that the policy changes are rare, it deserves to pay a special attention to see why the central banks prefer the status quo under Knightian uncertainty. Central bankers have multiple objectives and confront a variety of economic circumstances. They know that their actions have significant impacts on the economy, but the timing, magnitude, and channels of those impacts are not fully understood. They, in contrast, have a concern that their reputation would deteriorate dramatically if their actions have 3 Giannoni (2002 Giannoni ( , 2006 supports this under more general environments.
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wrong impacts on the economy. Under the circumstances, it may become desirable for the central banks not to change the policy targets when the parameter uncertainty makes the impacts uncertain enough.
In macroeconomics, it has been a conventional wisdom that central banks implement monetary policy in a gradual fashion (see, for example, Blinder [1997] ). Many researchers claim that this gradualism is due to 'optimal cautiousness', although some others suggest alternative interpretations (see, for example, Rudebusch [2005] ).
Interest-rate smoothing or monetary policy inertia is, however, different from monetary policy with infrequent changes and some discontinuous jumps. When using low frequency data, the two types of monetary policies may be observationally equivalent.
But their macroeconomic implications will be different at least in the short-run and may be so even in the long-run. It is practically very important to pay a special attention to macroeconomic consequences of the stop-go policy that changes the policy instrument infrequently.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model and section 3 explains the policy objectives. Section 4 derives the optimal monetary rules in a general framework and section 5 extends them in the case where the nature takes two states. Section 6 shows the calibrated optimal stop-go policy rules and section 7 checks their robustness. Section 8 shows that the calibrated optimal stop-go policy rules can predict actual rates of MRO set by ECB well. Section 9 summarizes our main results and refers to their implications.
The Basic Model
We consider a simple macro model where the policymaker faces uncertainty on average expectations of informed and uninformed private agents. Except for the heterogeneous information structure of the private agents, our basic model follows a standard new Keynesian model:
(1)
where x t = the gap between actual output and the flexible-price equilibrium output level, (2) is a new Keynesian Phillips curve. The variable u t is an exogenous demand shock and the variable w t is an exogenous supply shock. Each shock consists of a permanent shock and a temporary shock. Each permanent shock follows a random walk process, while each temporary shock is independently identically distributed overtime. We assume that the policymaker who observed all of the realized innovations in period t-1 decides its policy instrument i t before observing any realized innovations in period t.
What is crucial in the following analysis is that the policymaker faces uncertainty on how average expectations of the private agents will change when the interest rate changes. In our model, this happens because there are both informed and uninformed private agents in the economy. We assume that the informed private agents have all of the policymaker's information but that the uninformed private agents have no information on the exogenous shocks realized in the last period. The policymaker knows their information structures and can infer the expectations of each type of agent.
But since the number of each type stochastically changes overtime, the policymaker cannot see the weight of each type. This makes average expectations of the private agents uncertain for the policymaker.
The Private Agents' Expectations
In our economy, the informed private agents not only have the same information as the policymaker but also know all economic structures including the policymaker's loss function. Their expectations, E t I x t+1 , and E t I  t+1 , are thus independent of the policy decision in period t, where E t I is the conditional expectation operator of the informed private agents based on the information in period t. The uninformed private agents, in contrast, have no information of the exogenous shocks realized in the last period, although they can observe the policy instrument without noise. They thus need to update their expectations based on Bayesian Kalman filter when the policymaker decides its policy instrument. We denote the conditional expectation operator of the uninformed private agents based on the information before and after the policy decision in period t by E t,0 UI and E t,1 UI respectively. Then, the uninformed private agents update their expectations as follows
Equations (3a) and (3b) prior that the share of the uninformed private agents is  t where 0 <  t < 1. Then average expectations of the private agents for the policymaker are written as
where
Equations (4a) and (4b) state that how x t+1 e and  t+1 e will change depends on how i t changes and that there exists uncertainty on the elasticity. They suggest that the agents respond to the policy change sometimes aggressively but sometimes modestly in forming the expectation. Under (3) and (4) By definition, it holds that
Defining  1+ and  k +(k +), equations (1)-(4) then lead to:
where x t and  t denote the realized values after the nominal interest rate is determined. Equations (7) and (8) determine the equilibrium values of x t and  t in our model. Because of uncertainty on  t , the policymaker cannot see exact values of x t and  t in period t unless i t = 0. In contrast, the policymaker can see x 
The Policy Objectives
The policymaker chooses its policy instrument so as to achieve the policy objective.
We suppose that the objective of the policymaker is to set the nominal interest rate at each point of time so as to minimize the "expected" value of the following loss function:
In the loss function, loss in period t depends on deviations of output gap and inflation rate from their targets x* and * as well as interest rate changes in period t.
Exogenous parameter  and  are greater than or equal to zero and are treated as independent of the specification of the structural equations.
What makes the following analysis distinctive from the standard minimization problem is that we characterize the expected loss minimization of the policymaker by the Choquet expectation. To distinguish it from standard expectation operator E, we defined the Choquet expectation operator by E Q . Having aversion to Knightian uncertainty, the policymaker chooses its policy instrument i t so as to minimize E Q L t .
More general representation of the Choquet expectation is extensively discussed in Schmeidler (1989) .
Suppose that the random variable  t takes n alternative values,
Choquet expectation of the loss function is written as
where () is a convex probability capacity (or a convex non-additive probability function). 4 If () is a probability measure, the problem is degenerated to the traditional expected loss minimization problem. In this case, substituting (7) and (8) into (9), the first-order conditions  E Q L t /i t =  EL t /i t = 0 lead to the time-invariant policy rule such that
This simple monetary policy rule is similar to a Taylor rule in the sense that the nominal interest rate is adjusted in response to "output gap" and "inflation rate".
Because of uncertainty in  t , the second moments of  t appear in the denominator of the feedback rule. This reflects a version of Brainard's effect where the policymaker's optimal rule becomes less aggressive under parameter uncertainty. It is noteworthy that the rule does not depend on how expectations are formed nor what stochastic processes the exogenous shocks follow. However, "output gap" and "inflation rate" in (11) are those before the central bank sets the new interest rate. In addition, unlike standard Taylor rules, the coefficient of lagged inflation is always equal to unity. 
Robust Optimal Policy Rules
The policy rule (11) is no longer optimal when the policymaker has some aversion to uncertainty. One technical problem in deriving the optimal rule under uncertainty is
convex in i t , it is optimal for the central bank to set i t =  if and only if E Q L t /i t  0 when i t approaches to  from above and E Q L t /i t  0 when i t approaches to  4 Let  be a state space and let () denote the set of all subsets of . Then, a convex probability capacity (or a convex non-additive probability function) is defined as function  :
Since it is additive, it is not a probability measure unless the last inequality is always satisfied as an equality. 5 In previous literature, Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999) provides strong support for rules in which the first-difference of the federal funds rate responds to output and inflation gaps.
10 from below. This implies that the central bank decides not to change the nominal interest rate if and only if  E Q L t /i t  0 as i t →+0 and  E Q L t /i t  0 as i t → -0. We obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Suppose that the random variable  t takes n alternative values such that
Then, the central bank decides not to change the nominal interest rate if and only if
where  I () is a convex probability capacity in the case where 0
These equations imply that when (
The above result suggests that the policymaker may keep the interest rate unchanged even if the exogenous shocks change output gaps and inflation rates. If both  I ()and
. Consequently, in the absence of uncertainty aversion, the necessary and sufficient conditions in the above proposition are never satisfied for any measurable parameter set. However, to the extent that the policymaker has uncertainty aversion, that is, when  I ()and  II () are a convex probability capacities, the conditions hold for some measurable parameter set. The reason why the policymaker may choose i t = 0 is that the policymaker faces additional uncertainty unless i t = 0. To the extent that the policymaker has uncertainty aversion, it can therefore be optimal to set i t = 0 for some measurable range.
Toe the extent that   
t > 0 where *  ( A + B )/2 and  A + B  0. When the nature takes the two states, we denote the convex probability capacity as
t , and (
A parameter  (> 0) denotes the degree of -contamination in the Choquet expectation. Since the Choquet expectation puts more weight on the worst outcome,  is contaminated to be smaller when
t in the Choquet expectation. The loss function is then written as
When  = 0, the problem is degenerated to the traditional expected loss minimization problem. When  = 1, the problem is degenerated to the classical mini-max problem where the policymaker minimizes only the worst case scenario. An increase in  implies that the policymaker becomes less certain whether the subjective distribution is true distribution. Thus, an increase in  can be interpreted as an increase in Knightian 13 uncertainty.
Unless  = 0, the "expected" loss function E Q L t is not differentiable. However, the proposition in the last section leads to the following corollary.
Corollary: In the case where the nature takes the two states, the central bank decides not to change the nominal interest rate if and only if
For the probability capacity, the term In the absence of Knightian uncertainty,  is equal to zero, so that there exists no measurable range of parameters that satisfy the above inequalities. However, to the extent that  > 0, some measurable range of parameters satisfy the above inequalities.
Given the parameters, the range is wider as either  or  A - B is larger.
Unless the condition (14) holds, the central bank changes its interest rate based on a feedback rule. The rule is, however, time-variant in the sense that the feedback parameters vary depending on realized exogenous shocks and parameters. If we define
2 , and  ,II
, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Define Proof: See Appendix 2.
The monetary policy rules i t = z I , i t = z II , and i t = z A,B are similar to a Taylor rule in the sense that the nominal interest rate is adjusted in response to "output gap" and "inflation rate". Except that i t = z A,B , they also reflect a version of Brainard's effect where the policymaker's optimal rule becomes less aggressive when the variances increase. However, the elasticity of i t to output gap and inflation rate not only depends on the degree of uncertainty aversion (that is, ) but also differs for different ranges of i t . Consequently, the nominal interest rate shows different responses to "output gap" and "inflation rate" depending on whether i t is positive or not and whether i t is greater than z A,B or not.
It is also noteworthy that none of the Taylor type rules is optimal when the condition (14) holds. This implies that the policymaker, who has uncertainty aversion, sometimes keeps the interest rate unchanged and sometimes implements discontinuous jumps of the interest rate. This type of stop-go policy is different from standard interest-rate smoothing or monetary policy inertia that was regarded as a conventional wisdom in macroeconomics. The macroeconomic consequences for x t and  t are also different because x t and  t take different values depending on whether i t was changed or not. Our model has six constant parameters (, , k, , , and ), two policy targets (x* and *), and one random parameter  t . The discount factor  is set equal to 0.999, appropriate for interpreting the time interval as one month. We use the interest rate elasticity of the aggregate demand of  = 0.07 and the slope of Phillips curve of k = 0.02, which imply  = 0.21 and k = 0.06 by quarterly data. 7 We set a weight on output fluctuation of  = 0.01 and a weight on interest change of  = 0 in the loss function.
Predictability of Federal Fund Rates
We also set the elasticity of the private agents' expectations of  = 0.25. For the policy targets, we set x* to be 0% and * to be 1.8%, which is lower than average inflation rate in the 2000s.
For the random parameter  t , we investigate the case of two states. As in the last section, we consider the convex probability capacity such that ( A ) = (1-) and The superiority of our model can be also confirmed even when comparing with a standard Taylor rule whose coefficients are estimated by ordinary least squares. The standard Taylor rule we used is i t = constant 
Prediction under Different Degrees of Uncertainty
In the last section, we showed that our stop-and-go Taylor rule can track monthly FF rates very well. The most noteworthy result is that uncertainty aversion of the policymaker is useful in tracking infrequent policy changes in actual FF rates. In this section, we check how different degree of uncertainty will change the time series
property of predicted FF rates. In our model,  t is the only random structural parameter that changes over time. In our benchmark case, we set  A = 0.25 and  B = -0.25 for the random parameter. We first examine how the predicted series will change when we use alternative combinations of ( A ,  B ) = (0.175, -0.175), (0.3, 0.3), and (0.5, -0.5). In all of the combinations, the average value of  t is set to be zero. The experiment thus explores how a mean-preserving spread will affect the predicted FF rates. In contrast with  t , the degree of -contamination changes the policymaker's aversion to uncertainty. Therefore, given the distribution of  t , changes of  will capture another type of uncertainty changes. For the degree of -contamination, we set  = 0.023 in our benchmark case. We examine how the predicted series will change when we use alternative values of  = 0.01, 0.04, and 0.07. Figure 6 depicts the interest rates for these alternative values of  from January 2001 to December 2007. Like Figure 5 , the initial value of i t is chosen so that the predicted value is equal to the actual value in August 2001. It is easy to see that the interest rate changes are more infrequent when  = 0.04 and much more infrequent when  =0.07. An increase of uncertainty aversion will make the interest rates change less frequent. They are, however, more frequent when  = 0.01 for which the policymaker's uncertainty aversion is negligible.
The above results suggest that both a mean-preserving spread of  t and an increase of uncertainty aversion will make the interest rates change less frequent. However, in predicting actual FF rates, they have different implications. To see this, we examine how the predicted series will change when we use alternative combinations of ( A ,  B , ).
Specifically, we examine how the predicted series will change when we use alternative combinations of ( A ,  B , ) = (0.18, -0.18, 0.06) and (0.4, -0.4, 0.01). Since ( A ,  B , ) = (0.25, -0.25, 0.023) in the benchmark case, the first is a combination that has smaller mean-preserving spread of  t but larger uncertainty aversion, while the second is a combination that has larger mean-preserving spread of  t but smaller uncertainty aversion. This implies that larger mean-preserving spread of  t cannot predict unchanged policy that happens only for some specific periods. Larger mean-preserving spread of  t is helpful only in making the predicted series smooth throughout the period.
Predictability of ECB's Targeted Interest Rate
In section 6, we have demonstrated that our stop-and-go Taylor rule can track monthly policy changes in the United States very well. The purpose of this section is to explore whether the stop-and-go Taylor rule can also track policy changes by European Central bank (ECB). Specifically, we investigate how well our robust optimal monetary policy can predict monthly interest rates on the main refinancing operations (MRO) set by ECB from January 2001 to December 2007.
As in previous sections, we investigate the case of two states where Corollary and Proposition 2 in section 5 lead to the time-variant Taylor rule. Unlike section 6, we set * = 1.775% which implies that ECB has slightly tighter inflation target than Federal
Reserve Board (FRB) in the loss function. We also set  = 0.051 and  = 0.03. However, to make the following results comparable to those in previous sections, we use the exactly same values as those in section 6 for the other parameters. 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we explored why the central bank's policy instrument remains so unchanged under uncertainty. Although infrequent policy changes have been widely observed in many central banks, they have not been taken into account in previous macro models. This is true even in previous studies that investigated optimal monetary policy under model uncertainty or robust optimal policy rules. A large number of studies agreed that there is clearly much uncertainty over policy multipliers.
However, most previous studies concluded that multiplier uncertainty may make optimal policy more conservative but does not lead to a policy of "doing nothing". A key departure of our paper from these studies is the introduction of a stop-go monetary policy under Knightian uncertainty or a robust control framework. This increases an incentive for the central bank to keep the policy instrument unchanged even when exogenous shocks change output gap and inflation rate. The calibrated optimal stop-go policy rules could track actual target rates of FRB and ECB quite well even if the policymaker's uncertainty aversion is very small.
Needless to say, our stop-go monetary policy is not the only explanation for why the central banks' policy changes are so infrequent. Infrequent decision-making meetings would be one reason why the policy target changes so infrequently. Infrequent observations of macroeconomic data could be another reason. However, as we discussed briefly in the introduction, policy changes are less frequent than what these institutional constraints predict. This paper filled the gaps that the institutional constraints could not explain.
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Appendix: Derivation of Proposition 2
In this Appendix, we prove Proposition 2 in section 5. Suppose that 
This implies that
This indicates that it is optimal for the central bank to set i t = z A,B if and only if (B2) holds.
In addition, recall that
2 , and
and that when i t < 0 or
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